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This report summarizes the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) 
Update for Australia. The assessment was undertaken over the course of two missions, April 23 ̶ 
May 15 and July 9 ̶ July 24, 2012. The team comprised Cheng Hoon Lim (Head), Nancy Rawlings 
(Deputy), Xiaoyong Wu (Deputy), Su Hoong Chang, Luc Everaert, Eija Holttinen, David Parker, 
Kiran Sastry, and Katharine Seal (all MCM); Niamh Sheridan (APD); Iryna Kaminska (ICD); 
Dinah Knight (LEG); and the following IMF external consultants: Richard Britton, Michael Deasy, 
and Michael Hafeman. The main FSAP findings are as follows: 
 Australia’s financial system is sound, resilient, and well-managed. Major banks are 
conservatively run, well capitalized and profitable, and they are likely to withstand 
severe shocks. 
 However, a number of risks will need to be closely managed, including risks from a 
combination of high household debt and elevated house prices, reliance on offshore 
funding, and a highly concentrated and interconnected banking system. A higher 
minimum capital requirement for systemically important institutions may be desirable. 
 The financial regulatory and supervisory framework exhibits a high degree of 
compliance with international standards. Nevertheless, there is some room for 
improvement in certain areas of supervision, such as on-site supervisory review of 
banks’ liquidity risk management. 
 Commendable steps have been taken to strengthen crisis management. Crisis 
preparedness can be further enhanced by conducting regular simulations, and 
continued efforts are warranted for recovery and resolution planning. Arrangements 
are in place to manage cross-border risk.   
The main authors of this report are Cheng Hoon Lim, Nancy Rawlings, and Xiaoyong Wu with 
contributions from the FSAP team. 
FSAP assessments are designed to assess the stability of the financial system as a whole and not that 
of individual institutions. They have been developed to help countries identify and remedy weaknesses 
in their financial sector structure, thereby enhancing their resilience to macroeconomic shocks and 
cross-border contagion. FSAP assessments do not cover risks that are specific to individual 
institutions such as asset quality, operational or legal risks, or fraud. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Australia’s financial system is sound, resilient, and well managed. Australia is 
one of the few advanced economies to avoid a recession during the global financial crisis 
(GFC), supported by strong economic fundamentals at the onset of the crisis, a well-
coordinated response as the crisis unfolded, and a mining investment boom fueled by a surge 
in China’s demand for commodities. Five years on, both the economy and the financial sector 
continue to outperform most of their peers. The authorities’ timely response to the fallout 
from the GFC, their prudent economic management, and strong supervision of the financial 
sector, has kept Australia on the dwindling list of AAA rated countries. 
2. The global outlook, however, remains uncertain and Australia’s financial sector 
is not immune to persistent volatility in global markets. Recent developments, including 
the unresolved European debt crisis, the anemic recovery in the United States, and the growth 
slowdown in China, suggest that the international environment will remain unfavorable for 
an extended period. This could exacerbate the vulnerabilities of a country with a structural 
current account deficit. The banking sector also faces challenges. The prospect of higher 
funding costs and slower credit growth, as businesses and households deleverage and become 
more conservative in their borrowing decisions, may encourage banks to take on greater risks 
to maintain profitability.  
3. Against this backdrop, a number of risks will need to be closely managed (see 
RAM). The financial sector, which has assets more than three times the size of GDP, is 
dominated by four large banks, which have broadly similar business models and rely on 
wholesale funding. Residential mortgages are the banks’ single largest asset, and a 
combination of high household debt and elevated house prices increases the risk in this 
portfolio. These are long standing structural issues that will remain key sources of risk over 
the medium-term. Nevertheless, these risks are mitigated by the fact that the authorities have 
considerable policy space to respond to negative shocks given low public debt, a flexible 
exchange rate, some scope for monetary easing, and a well capitalized banking system. 
4. Stress testing by APRA and the IMF shows that the banking system is likely to 
withstand severe shocks. The banks’ capital positions seemed capable of withstanding a 
range of adverse scenarios ranging from slow growth to severe macroeconomic shocks, even 
after taking into account banks’ cross-border-exposures. Under the most severe scenario, 
aggregate Tier 1 capital remains above the minimum threshold, although total capital of some 
banks falls slightly below the threshold after two years. The liquidity stress test, which 
simulated a bank-run type scenario, indicates that banks would be able to withstand a severe 
liquidity shock with support from the RBA under a new Basel-approved facility, and 
withdrawals of funding from banks in the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan would 
have the largest impact.  
5. While the results are satisfactory, the exercise has suggested that there is room 
for improvement in the authorities’ own stress testing processes. APRA, which applies its 
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own analysis, consistency checks, and judgment in interpreting stress testing results 
generated by banks, needs to devote more resources to stress testing. The RBA should 
consider establishing its own macro-financial stress testing framework, which could enhance 
its ability to identify and monitor emerging systemic risks. 
6. A higher capital threshold for the systemically important institutions may be 
desirable to further bolster financial system stability. The four major banks are 
systemically important, which imposes a negative externality on the domestic financial 
system. Significant and protracted difficulties in any one of them would have severe 
repercussions for the entire financial system and, in turn, the real economy. To address this 
externality, the Basel Committee considers it appropriate for supervisory authorities to 
conduct more intensive supervision and require additional capital of systemically important 
institutions. Given the already strong supervision and progress in recovery and resolution 
planning, a higher minimum capital requirement would provide higher loss absorbency and 
would seem a natural next step to take. In addition, the four major banks enjoy a funding cost 
advantage derived from an implicit government guarantee, and should bear some of the cost 
of mitigating systemic risk. 
7. The financial regulatory and supervisory framework exhibits a high degree of 
compliance with international standards. The principles-based and outcome-oriented 
supervisory approach of APRA is effective, with notable strengths in risk analyses embedded 
in the PAIRS and SOARS system, industry-wide risk assessments, and a focus on bank 
boards’ responsibility for risk management. ASIC is also a highly regarded enforcer of 
market regulation. Yet, there is some room for improvement in certain areas of supervision, 
such as further enhancing APRA’s formal on-site supervisory review of banks’ liquidity risk 
management. The adequacy and stability of ASIC’s funding is crucial for it to carry out 
proactive supervision, so it is important to increase its core funding.  
8. Systemic oversight and the arrangement for policy and supervisory coordination 
are effective. The Council of Financial Regulators plays a key role in coordinating financial 
regulation and stability issues. The coordination arrangement under the Council works well, 
as demonstrated by the quick and appropriate response to the unfolding crisis during the 
GFC. Given the Council’s important role, it is beneficial to further highlight its work and 
enhance the transparency of its deliberative processes. A more explicit report of the 
Council’s deliberations in the Financial Stability Review would be a first step toward 
achieving these objectives. 
9. Impressive steps have been taken to strengthen the financial safety net and crisis 
management framework in recent years. Progress since the 2006 FSAP includes the 
establishment of the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) to protect depositors and general 
insurance policy holders, and strengthening APRA’s powers. Going forward, a key priority 
should be to continue to enhance crisis preparedness through early planning. In addition, 
some form of ex-ante funding could help mitigate the moral hazard inherent in a highly 
concentrated banking sector. Of the several options available, ex-ante funded deposit 
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insurance, which ensures that the banking industry bears at least part of the cost of bank 
failures, and higher loss absorbency requirements for systemically important institutions 
would seem to represent the best options since the infrastructure is already in place. The 
authorities have also enacted laws and signed Memoranda of Understanding with New 
Zealand and other jurisdictions to facilitate cross-border cooperation on financial stability 
and supervisory matters.  
10. The FSAP’s high priority recommendations are noted in Table 1. These 
recommendations are expected to have a near-term implementation timeframe.  
 
Table 1. High Priority FSAP Recommendations 
 
Recommendations Responsible Authority 
Financial Stability 
1. Develop a top down stress testing framework and publish top down stress 
test results in the Financial Stability Review RBA 
2. Devote more resources to stress testing APRA 
3. Introduce higher loss absorbency (HLA) for systemic banks APRA 
Financial Sector Oversight 
4. Intensify on-site supervision of bank liquidity and upgrade daily liquidity 
reporting requirements to ensure consistency APRA 
5. Improve the effectiveness of conduct of business supervision for insurance 
companies (note recommendation 6 below) ASIC 
6. Ensure sufficiency and stability of ASIC core funding Treasury 
7. Extend risk based capital requirements, large exposure rules, and reporting 
requirements to ensure that AFSL holders are appropriately covered ASIC 
Crisis Management 
8. Re-evaluate the merits of ex-ante funding for the FCS with a view to 
converting it to an ex-ante funded scheme Treasury/CFR
9. Introduce HLA for systemic banks (see recommendation 3 above) APRA 
10. Ensure ADI implementation of single customer view (SCV) on, or where 
possible, ahead of the agreed timetable APRA 
11. Conduct frequent and focused crisis simulations and other forms of 
resolution testing APRA/CFR 
12. Continue recovery planning and introduce resolution planning APRA 
1/ Medium- and low-priority recommendations are noted elsewhere in the main report. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   Handling the Crisis  
11. Five years after the U.S. sub-prime debacle triggered the global financial crisis 
(GFC), the Australian economy continues to thrive. Australia is one of the few advanced 
economies to avoid a recession, in part because of strong fundamentals at the onset of the 
crisis. Growth dipped only briefly below trend during the crisis and rebounded quickly, 
supported by robust demand for commodities from China, which fueled a mining boom and 
pushed the terms of trade to 60-year highs (Figure 1). As a result, the current account deficit 
fell to about 2½ percent of GDP in the first half of 2011 from an average of 4½ percent for 
the previous 15 years. Australia looks set to continue its two decades of uninterrupted 
expansion, with the economy expected to grow close to trend at 3-3.5 percent annually in 
2012 and 2013. Inflation, meanwhile, is expected to remain subdued and well within the 
authorities’ target band of 2-3 percent over the medium-term.  
 Figure 1. Growth and Demand for Commodities 
 
 
12. Australian banks performed well during the GFC and their performance has 
since improved. Although banks did experience some funding pressure during the crisis, 
there was no bank failure and only a small increase in nonperforming loans (NPL). Banks 
have emerged with stronger capital positions. Their capital adequacy ratio rose to 
11.8 percent in June 2012 from 11.4 percent in December 2008, accompanied by a rising 
share of Tier 1 capital in total capital and reflecting both new capital raising and a shift 
toward lower-risk assets such as mortgages (Figure 2). Profitability has also improved after a 
drop during the crisis, with annualized after-tax return on equity rising to 15 percent in the 
fourth quarter of 2011 from 4.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009. In fact, Australian banks 
are currently among the most profitable in the world (Appendix 2). 
Figure 2. Bank Capital and Asset Quality 
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13.      Sound economic management, a proactive approach to supervision and a well-
coordinated crisis response have helped maintain financial system soundness and 
stability. The authorities responded quickly to the GFC with a sizable fiscal stimulus and 
substantial cuts in the policy rate to support domestic demand. To bolster market and 
consumer confidence, the government introduced the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS) in 
October 2008 guaranteeing deposits up to A$1 million per account holder per Authorized 
Deposit-taking Institution (ADI). 1 A separate fee-based, unlimited, guarantee was introduced 
at the same time for wholesale funding instruments and large deposits above A$1 million. 
These guarantee schemes reassured depositors and investors and helped keep Australian 
banks’ access to offshore funding open.2 The authorities’ adept handling of the fallout from 
the GFC, their prudent economic management, and strong supervision of the financial sector, 
has kept Australia on the dwindling list of AAA rated countries. 
B.   But Global Uncertainty Persists 
14.      Prospects for the global economy remain uncertain and Australia is not immune 
to further volatility in global markets. The uncertainty stems mainly from the unresolved 
European debt crisis. Growth in the United States remains anemic, with business and 
consumer confidence kept weak by bouts of turmoil in international financial markets and an 
unclear fiscal outlook. China’s economy has also slowed, reducing demand for commodities 
and putting downward pressure on the terms of trade. The confluence of negative 
developments suggests that the unfavorable international environment will persist for an 
extended period, which could slow the global economy with knock-on effects for Australia.  
15.      Financial institutions around the world are adjusting to greater scrutiny and 
tighter regulation. Under Basel III and G-20 commitments, national regulators will improve 
the quality of supervision, impose more stringent capital and liquidity requirements, 
including higher loss absorbency for systemically important institutions, and establish a 
sound resolution framework to ensure a safer financial system. Many countries are also 
embracing macroprudential policy as an additional tool to manage systemic risk in their 
financial systems. With a changing regulatory environment, markets are also demanding 
higher standards, putting greater scrutiny on financial institutions. 
                                                 
1A separate Policyholder Compensation Facility was established under the FCS for general insurers. The FCS 
had been under development when the crisis brought forward the legislation and the deposit coverage was set at 
a higher level than originally envisaged in response to the crisis. 
2While the wholesale funding guarantee is no longer in place, the government has since confirmed the FCS as a 
permanent feature of Australia’s financial system and reduced the cap from A$1 million to A$250,000 per 
account holder per ADI. The new permanent cap has applied since February 1, 2012. 
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II.   FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY 
A.   Managing Risks and Vulnerabilities  
16.      Australia’s financial sector is large and mature with assets totaling 340 percent 
of GDP. The financial sector has grown rapidly mainly owing to the expansion of home 
mortgages and superannuation funds (a retirement scheme comprising mandatory 
contributions by employers and voluntary and tax-concessional contributions by employees). 
ADIs, mostly banks, are the dominant group of financial institutions with 60 percent of 
financial sector assets, followed by superannuation funds (including investment-linked 
superannuation written by life insurance companies) with 25 percent. The non-life insurance 
sector is relatively small with 3 percent of financial sector assets, and non-superannuation 
managed funds have another 6 percent. The stock market had a capitalization of 80 percent of 
GDP at end-2011, although this was below the peak of 150 percent in mid-2007.  
17.      Australia’s financial sector faces a unique set of risks. Its banking sector is 
concentrated, dominated by four large banks, and their broadly similar business models and 
reliance on offshore funding leave them exposed to common shocks and disruptions to 
funding markets. Against a still worrying global environment, these risks will need to be 
closely monitored, particularly if the domestic economy slows sharply.  
18.      Fortunately, Australia is well positioned to respond to negative shocks. A 
combination of low public debt, flexible exchange rate, scope for monetary easing, and a 
well capitalized banking system should give the authorities ample policy space to respond. 
As a G-20 member and committed to financial reforms, Australia intends to implement new 
Basel III standards for capital from 2013, well ahead of schedule, and broadly follow the 
timetable for liquidity. The authorities are also implementing recovery planning requirements 
for large and medium-sized ADIs and considering resolution planning. These steps, as well 
as the FCS as a complement to long-established depositor preference provisions, should 
place Australia in a position of strength to deal with down-side risks. 
B.   What Are the Key Sources of Risks? 
19.      Banks may not see the same level of profitability as they have become 
accustomed to. The mining boom in recent years has contributed to the appreciation of the 
Australian dollar and created a multi-speed economy (Appendix 2). While the mining sector 
is growing fast, its contribution to credit demand is small, accounting for less than 1 percent 
of total lending. The non-mining sector generates most business credit demand but has faced 
pressures from the strong exchange rate and weak confidence. Moreover, households are 
saving more, putting an end to two decades of rapid retail credit expansion. Just as weaker 
credit demand limits revenue growth, funding costs are increasing as banks compete for retail 
deposits to replace wholesale funding. Pressure on the net interest margin, which accounts 
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for almost two-thirds of operating income, has the potential to encourage more risk-taking by 
banks in order to preserve profitability (Figure 3).3 
Figure 3. Credit Growth and Net Interest Margin 
  
20.      Difficult conditions in the global financial environment may affect banks’ 
overseas asset performance. The total foreign claims of the banking system amount to 
22 percent of consolidated assets of which 6 percent are cross-border claims. About 
40 percent of these claims are on New Zealand and a combined 26 percent on the UK and 
Europe, a part of the world that is under financial pressures (Figure 4). A growth slowdown 
in New Zealand, which is also a net importer of capital, or an escalation of the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe, could impair the quality of banks’ overseas assets. Currently, banks’ non-
performing overseas assets are manageable at about 0.3 percent of consolidated assets, a 
slight decline from the peak of 0.4 percent in mid-2010. Asset performance for banks’ New 
Zealand operations has improved in recent quarters in line with better economic conditions in 
the country. However, performance remains weak for their operations in the UK. Their 
exposure to Euro Area banks is less than 1 percent of their consolidated assets.  
Figure 4. Foreign Claims of Australian Banks1/ 
 
      Sources: BIS, March 2012 and RBA Financial Stability Review, September 2012.    
       1/ Measured on a consolidated, ultimate risk basis. 
                                                 
3Riskier activities could include, for example, loosening underwriting standards or expanding too quickly into 
new business or geographic regions.  
Euro 
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21.      The concentration and interconnectedness in the banking sector mean that 
idiosyncratic risks may have a systemic impact. Australia’s four major banks hold 
80 percent of banking assets and 88 percent of residential mortgages (Figure 5).4 The major 
banks are highly interconnected, as they are among each other’s largest counterparties, and 
their expected default frequencies (EDFs) from Moody’s KMV are highly correlated. They 
have grown faster than the banking sector as a whole since the GFC, partly due to the 
acquisition of smaller banks and deleveraging by some foreign-owned banks. The major 
banks are highly profitable, enjoying a funding cost advantage derived partly from implicit 
government support and earning larger net interest margins than smaller banks and 
international peers. While their pricing power and greater risk diversification help sustain 
profitability, their size implies that, in the event of a failure, the impact on the financial 
system and the economy would be potentially substantial. Given their systemic importance, 
special risk mitigation arrangements, including more intensive supervision, higher loss 
absorbency, and robust recovery and resolution plans, will help prevent the failure of major 
banks and, should one occur, limit its impact and fiscal costs. 
Figure 5. Banking Sector Concentration 
  
22.      The banking sector continues to rely on wholesale funding, although banks are 
making efforts to change their funding structure. In particular, banks are reducing short-
term wholesale borrowing and attracting retail deposits. The share of deposits has risen to 
53 percent of total liabilities from 40 percent in mid-2008, while the share of short-term 
wholesale debt declined to 19 percent from 33 percent (Figure 6).5 The shift in the funding 
structure, however, has been accompanied by increased funding costs. The higher funding 
                                                 
4Data from Bankscope are used for coverage and consistency. Other data sources and metrics produce different 
results in terms of ranking, but a banking system with four banks holding 80 percent of the assets is considered 
concentrated regardless of the ranking. 
5Offshore short-term wholesale funding used by Australian banks is below 10 percent of liabilities, with a 
considerable proportion of this in the form of deposits. 
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cost is due to competition for retail deposits and larger spreads on wholesale debt and cross 
currency swaps since the GFC—most of the increase has been passed on to borrowers. 
Figure 6. Bank Funding Structure and Cost 
  
  
 
23.      Offshore foreign currency funding is still large. The turmoil in international 
financial markets has prompted Australian banks to borrow more domestically. The share of 
bank bonds issued off-shore fell from 78 percent of the total in 2007 to 60 percent in 
2011 (Figure 7). The maturity of off-shore bonds has also lengthened, with those maturing in 
less than a year falling from 80 percent in 2007 to 56 percent in 2011. However, banks’ net 
foreign liabilities, denominated mostly in foreign currency, are still sizable at 24 percent of 
GDP.6 While almost all foreign currency positions are hedged, in the extreme event that 
counterparties failed to deliver, banks might have to obtain foreign currency in the spot 
market, possibly at unfavorable exchange rates until they find a replacement hedge (Box 1).7 
In addition, the banks could be exposed to rollover risk during times of stress. To lessen the 
risk from international financial market turmoil, banks should be encouraged to continue 
                                                 
6Gross foreign liabilities of the Australian banking system are not large compared to many other developed 
banking systems, but banks in Australia use a larger amount of offshore funding domestically than banks in 
most other advanced economies. 
7Replacement hedges might not be difficult to obtain, though, as clients on the other side of the trade would also 
be looking for replacement hedges. 
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lengthening the maturity of offshore funding and increasing their domestic funding. As a 
longer-term solution, increased domestic savings would be important. The authorities’ plan 
to increase the contribution rate to the superannuation funds from 9 percent to 12 percent will 
help boost the pool of domestic savings that might be tapped for bank funding (Box 2). 
Figure 7. Off-shore Funding 
   
24.      The combination of high household debt and elevated house prices is a risk to 
banks’ large mortgage portfolio. As a ratio to household disposable income, Australia’s 
household debt, of which 90 percent are housing loans, is above the average of advanced 
economies in the G20 (Figure 8). Strong house price gains over much of the past two decades 
have made Australia’s house prices relatively expensive now. This combination exposes 
banks to negative income shocks generated by a sharp increase in unemployment. Moreover, 
around 30 percent of new mortgages are interest-only, a potentially riskier type of lending 
than regular mortgages, and 55 percent of those mortgages are interest-only investor loans. 
However, the risk is mitigated by a number of factors, including much larger household 
assets that dwarf household debt,8 relatively low household leverage with an average loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio of about 50 percent on outstanding owner-occupied loans and increased 
household savings over recent years. While about 30 percent of mortgages, primarily to first-
time buyers, have an LTV of 80 percent or more at origination, these are generally covered 
by private mortgage insurance. In addition, there is no tax incentive for owner-occupier debt, 
and prepayment on housing loans is prevalent and sizable.9 Mortgages are full recourse loans, 
giving borrowers an incentive to continue making payment even under stress.  
                                                 
8Household housing debt represents only about 30 percent of their housing assets, and household financial 
assets (non-housing) account for about 40 percent of household assets. The value of financial assets is more 
than double the value of housing debt. Moreover, interest-only-loans include mortgages with 100 percent off set 
accounts. 
9Prepayments of indebted home owners are, on average, equivalent to 18 months of scheduled repayments.  
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Box 1. Hedging Foreign Currency Risks 
 
Given major banks’ use of foreign currency funding, it is necessary to hedge their positions 
against foreign exchange rate risks. Like their international counterparts, Australian banks hedge 
foreign currency risks through cross currency basis swaps and FX swaps. Cross-currency basis 
swaps are usually used in conjunction with term borrowing of more than one year in maturity, 
either matching the amount and maturity of a particular bond or loan or in a portfolio of such 
transactions hedging the overall value of the portfolio. FX swaps, on the other hand, are used on a 
pooled basis for short-term borrowing of less than a year.  
 
A cross-currency basis swap agreement is a contract in which one party borrows one currency 
from, and simultaneously lends the same value of another currency to, another party. The contract 
specifies a price of the basis swap, which is usually expressed as a spread over the local money 
market interest rate. At the start of the contract, the principal amounts are exchanged at the 
prevailing spot exchange rate; during the contract term, the counterparties exchange interest 
payments at the agreed-on swap spread with a pre-determined frequency; and when the contract 
expires, the principal amounts are returned at the same spot rate as at the start of the contract. The 
transactions are collateralized under credit support annexes (CSAs). FX swaps operate in much 
the same way except for the exchange of interest payments during the contract term. 
 
 
  Sources: APRA and RBA. 
 
The swaps worked well for Australian banks during the GFC in that they generated collateral 
inflows as the Australian dollar depreciated. In cases where the hedge had to be replaced, banks 
were able to do so in a short period of time. From the banks’ perspective, a weaker exchange rate 
also reduces the amount of foreign currency needed to fund a given amount of domestic assets. 
When the exchange rate appreciates, the swap transactions require Australian banks to post more 
collateral, and limit the amount of foreign currency available to fund a given amount of domestic 
assets. 
 
The main currency-related risk for Australian banks is counterparty risk. Since the GFC, many of 
the traditional counterparties of Australian banks have been downgraded as a result of the 
deterioration in asset quality, indicating increased counterparty risk. Should a party to the swap 
transactions fail, the other party would have to find replacements for the swaps or be forced to 
obtain foreign currency on the spot market at potentially unfavorable exchange rates. The 
downgrades have prompted major Australian banks to tighten counterparty risk standards by 
requiring two-way CSAs, lowering collateral thresholds or adopting a strategy that focuses on a 
limited number of highly rated large internationally active commercial and investment banks. Of 
the outstanding notional principal amount of foreign currency related derivatives the four major 
Australian banks have with 40 counterparties, 44 percent are with the top five, i.e., Deutsche 
Bank, Citibank, JPMorgan, UBS and Barclays.
Banks' Funding Liabilities (March, 2012)
AUD-denominated FX-denominated Total FX-denominated share 
$b $b $b Per cent
Total Funding Liabilities
       Minimum FX estimate 2178 456 2634 17.3
       Maximum FX estimate 2074 560 2634 21.3
Residents 2050 31 2081 1.5
Non-residents
       Minimum FX estimate 128 424 553 76.8
       Maximum FX estimate 24 529 553 95.6
 - Deposits
       Minimum FX estimate 104 35 139 25.0
       Maximum FX estimate 0 139 139 100.0
 - Short-term wholesale 3 88 91 96.8
 - Long-term wholesale 21 302 323 93.4
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Box 2. Australia’s Superannuation System 
 
Superannuation is an important part of Australia’s retirement income system that also includes 
a tax payer funded age pension. The superannuation system is predominantly defined 
contribution in nature with compulsory contributions made by employers on behalf of 
employees as well as voluntary contributions made by employees, both supported by 
concessional tax arrangements. The compulsory contribution rate is currently set at 9 percent 
of ordinary earnings and scheduled to increase incrementally to 12 percent between 2013 and 
2019. The superannuation funds hold a significant amount of household savings representing 
about 60 percent of household financial assets. Assets of the superannuation funds total more 
than A$1.3 trillion, or close to 100 percent of GDP. Prudentially regulated superannuation 
funds manage about two-thirds of the assets (over A$800 billion), and the rest are held in self-
managed funds (SMSF) that is a rapidly growing sector.  
 
The current asset allocation is tilted toward equities, reflecting both personal preferences and 
the default investment strategy of many funds. As a result, the exposure to the banking sector 
is relatively small, at 17 percent of their total assets or 13 percent of banks’ liabilities. 
Although most funds allow members to make their own investment choices, some 42 percent 
of assets are in the default investment strategy determined by fund managers.  
 
The preference for equities reflects the strong performance of equities over the long run as well 
as favorable tax provisions that offer a tax credit on dividend income from Australian 
companies. As a result, more than half of superannuation assets are held in equities, with a 
slightly larger proportion in domestic than in international equities (see figure). The share of 
fixed income securities held in the funds, by contrast, is relatively small, reflecting in part the 
limited amount of high quality debt securities available. In recent years, there has been a 
gradual shift in the funds’ allocation away from equities and towards deposits. Since 2007, the 
aggregate allocation to cash and deposits has grown from 10 percent to 17 percent.  
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 Figure 8. Household Debt and Housing Loans 
  
  
 
25.      While some parts of the non-financial corporate sector have deleveraged, others 
remain under pressure. Business credit, which accounts for approximately one third of total 
lending, has declined by 4.1 percent since peaking in the fourth quarter of 2008. The steepest 
declines, 14 percent and 11 percent, respectively, have been in construction and 
manufacturing. Although deleveraging has been largely voluntary, resulting from a reduced 
appetite for debt and accompanied by increased equity raising and retained earnings, it has 
also been a reflection of weakness in many parts of the corporate sector. The mining sector is 
booming—with investment expected to surge to 8 percent of GDP—but below-trend growth 
elsewhere is hurting profitability, where equity valuations for most sectors are below average 
(Figure 9). Expected default frequencies from Moody’s KMV show weaker firms are now 
more susceptible to failure than before the crisis. The commercial real estate sector, which 
receives almost one-third of banks’ lending but accounts for almost half of banks’ current 
loan impairments, shows early signs of stabilization in vacancy rates and pricing. However, 
the leverage in agriculture, manufacturing, and services is still above the long-term historical 
average.  
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Figure 9. Non-Financial Corporate Sector Heat Map1  
 
  Sources: Worldscope database and IMF Staff Calculations. 
  Note: The default probability is the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) probability of default one-year ahead.  
  1Indicators for 2011 are compared to their average for the same sector between 1990 and 2011. + indicates above average; 
  - below average; red shading indicates more than 2 standard deviations away from average in a weaker direction; orange  
  indicates more than one but less than two standard deviations away from average.    
       
C.   Testing the Resiliency of the Banking System  
26.      Stress testing focused on credit, contagion and liquidity risks and covered five of 
the largest banks. The exercise combined individual bank stress tests under the guidance of 
APRA (bottom-up) and systemic macro-financial stress tests performed by the FSAP team 
(top-down).10 The top-down approach modeled credit risk in three different scenarios—a 
slow growth scenario, a mild recession scenario and a severe recession scenario, while the 
bottom-up approach used only the severe recession scenario. In addition, the FSAP team 
supplemented solvency and liquidity stress tests with a network analysis of the impact of an 
external funding shock using BIS data on international banking exposures. The stress tests 
were conducted using consolidated data and included banks’ cross-border exposure. 
27.      The different scenarios under the top-down approach are designed to capture a 
wide range of possible outcomes. In the slow-growth scenario, there is a one standard 
deviation shock to real GDP growth from the baseline, and in the mild recession scenario, the 
shock to real GDP is increased to two standard deviations.11 In the severe recession scenario, 
annual GDP growth swings from 2 percent to -5 percent during the first year, representing a 
shock of more than 4 standard deviations (Appendix 3). By comparison, using shocks of 
1-3 standard deviations is standard practice in stress testing exercises. The severe recession 
                                                 
10The balance sheet approach of Schmieder et al (2011) is used as the top-down stress testing framework. See 
Schmieder, Puhr, and Hasan, 2011, “Next Generation Balance Sheet Stress Testing,” IMF Working Paper 
11/83. 
11The standard deviations are based on the volatility of annual GDP growth from 1960, and the shocks are over 
the first three years of a five-year horizon with positive adjustment dynamics during the subsequent two years. 
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  19   
 
scenario represents an extreme tail event as the lowest recorded Australian GDP growth in 
the last fifty years was only -3 percent (Figure 10). However, it is comparable to the 
experience during the GFC of the United States with a swing in GDP growth from 1 percent 
to -5 percent, and of the United Kingdom with a swing from 4 percent to -5 percent. 
 Figure 10. GDP Growth Trajectories Under Different Growth Scenarios 
 
   Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
 
28.      Results of the top-down stress tests show that major banks are generally well 
capitalized. Their capital ratios, both total and Tier 1, remain above the minimum thresholds 
in the low growth and mild recession scenarios. The system-wide Tier 1 capital ratio would 
also remain above the threshold in the severe scenario. However, system-wide total capital 
would fall below the threshold of 8 percent after the second year of stress in the severe 
recession scenario before eventually stabilizing from the fourth year (Figure 11). Credit loss 
is the largest driver of capital loss, reflecting the contraction in GDP. The top-down stress 
test results are broadly consistent with those of the bottom-up approach. In particular, the 
sudden deterioration in the macro-economic environment results in a rapid loss of capital in 
years one and two in both cases.  
Figure 11. Impact of Alternative Scenarios on Bank Capitalization 
    
        Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
 
29.      The liquidity stress tests include an Implied Cash Flow Test (ICFT) and the risk 
of contagion from the withdrawal of offshore funding. An ICFT assesses banks’ capacity 
to cope with a bank-run type of scenario, simulating a gradual outflow of funding for a 
period of five weeks. Not surprisingly, banks do not have sufficient liquid assets to withstand 
such a shock because of the limited availability of highly-rated nonbank (mainly 
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government) domestic securities. However, all banks are able to offset the outflows with 
liquidity support from the RBA, even under stringent haircut assumptions. To complement 
the liquidity stress test, a network analysis of international funding shocks is conducted to 
identify the main sources of risk. The analysis, based on bilateral exposures of 27 banking 
systems, shows that the withdrawal of funding by banks in the United States, United 
Kingdom and Japan represents the biggest potential risk for the Australian banking system.  
30.      The RBA will create a committed liquidity facility (CLF) in 2015 to help ADIs 
meet the proposed liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) under Basel III. The LCR measures the 
amount of liquid assets on a bank’s balance sheet which, for many countries, would consist 
of government debt. Given the very limited amount of government debt in Australia, the 
Basel III framework has explicitly recognized the CLF as an alternative, under which ADIs 
will be able to access a specified amount of liquidity using repurchase agreements of eligible 
securities outside the RBA’s normal market operations. ADIs will be required to pay fees for 
this assistance, currently set at 15 basis points. The use of the facility will be at RBA’s 
discretion, and an ADI must have first received approval from APRA on the amount of 
liquidity requirement that can be met through the CLF. 
31.      There is room for improvement in the authorities’ stress testing process. 
Individual banks utilize different stress testing models, different approaches to estimate 
losses given defaults (LGDs) and probabilities of defaults (PDs), and use data of different 
levels of granularity. While they are required to apply APRA-determined credit migration 
matrices, PDs and LGDs for different portfolios, which APRA develops based on its 
judgment, the dispersion in banks’ practice makes analysis difficult for APRA. Hence, there 
is a need for APRA to devote more resources to bottom-up stress testing to validate and cross 
check individual bank results and to ensure overall consistency. In addition, the RBA does 
not have its own top-down stress testing framework, which could be a useful tool to further 
enhance its capacity to identify and monitor systemic risk. The stress testing framework and 
models should be developed to assist the next ADI industry stress test.  
D.   Addressing Systemic Banks: A Case for Higher Loss Absorbency12 
32.      The major banks enjoy implicit government support because of their systemic 
importance. A variety of indicators, including size, interconnectedness, and complexity, 
show clearly that the major banks are systemically important domestically (Figure 12). Their 
systemic importance causes a negative externality as significant and protracted difficulties in 
any one of them would undermine confidence and impinge on other banks with severe 
repercussions for the entire financial system and the real economy. As a result of their 
systemic importance, rating agencies reflect implicit government support in their ratings of 
major banks, which gives them a funding cost advantage. According to Fund staff estimates 
                                                 
12See Technical Note “Addressing Systemic Risk through Higher Loss Absorbency” for more details.  
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detailed in the Banking Sector technical note, this funding cost advantage rose from 80 basis 
points to 120 basis points during the GFC, when government support for the banking system 
was made more explicit.13  
33.      Addressing the externality resulting from their systemic importance requires a 
multi-pronged approach. Following international consensus, a number of countries have 
moved ahead with a comprehensive framework that includes more intensive supervision, 
recovery and resolution planning, and higher loss absorbency. The recent BCBS final paper 
on the policy framework for domestic systemic banks noted that the assessment and 
application of policy tools should allow for an appropriate degree of national discretion to 
accommodate structural characteristics of the domestic financial system. In Australia, the 
supervisory approach embedded in the PAIRS/SOARS system already incorporates more 
intensive supervision for systemically important institutions and recovery planning for these 
institutions is also moving ahead. To complement efforts on these two fronts, a higher loss 
absorbency requirement for systemic institutions should also be considered.  
Figure 12. Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
   
 Source: IMF staff calculations.         Source: Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2012) based on  
 Note: Index combines size, interconnectedness,        Fitch support ratings 
 and complexity; total financial system = 3        Notes: Large 4: ANZ, Commonwealth, NAB, Westpac; 
     R1: Suncorp; R2: Bendigo/Adelaide and Macquarie; 
     R3: Bank of Queensland 
 
34.      Higher loss absorbency for systemic institutions helps align incentives and 
protect taxpayer resources. The impact of failure of a systemic institution imposes a higher 
cost on the broader economy than that of a non-systemic institution. To mitigate this 
externality, systemic institutions should have a much higher probability of survival; higher 
than the solvency benchmark implied by the Basel metrics that currently apply to both 
systemic and non-systemic institutions. Some countries, including Austria, Singapore, and 
Sweden have already established higher loss absorbency requirements of 3 percentage points, 
                                                 
13Estimates of implicit support based on ratings are by their nature subjective and need to be interpreted with 
care. Alternative estimates based on the contingent claims analysis could yield different results (Noss and 
Sowerbutts, 2012 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/fs_paper15.aspx).  
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2 percentage points, and 5 percentage points, respectively, for their domestically important 
banks.  
35.      APRA’s current application of Basel II goes some way to meeting this objective 
through higher risk weights and a more conservative definition of risk absorbing 
capital. This approach could be complemented by explicitly requiring systemic institutions 
to hold a higher minimum capital requirement to ensure a greater probability of survival 
commensurate with their size and interconnectedness. In this regard, the Expected Default 
Frequency (EDFTM) of Moody’s KMV provides a method for gauging the desired level of 
capital consistent with a certain probability of survival (Box 3). As an illustration, this 
method suggests that, as of end-2011, maintaining a one-year ahead probability of 
99.9 percent of not defaulting on any payment would require the four major banks to hold 
additional Tier 1 capital ranging from -0.9 to 2.8 percent of RWA (Figure 13).14 
Alternatively, achieving a 99.95 percent probability of not defaulting on any payment would 
require the major banks to hold additional Tier 1 capital ranging from 1.4 to 5.2 percent of 
RWA. This would require all large banks to hold more capital: some by a trivial amount, 
others more substantially. How much additional capital may be ultimately required will 
depend on APRA’s risk tolerance.15  
Figure 13. Additional Tier 1 Capital Requirements for Systemic Banks 
 (in percent of Risk-weighted Assets) 
 
  
      Source: IMF Staff calculations.  
                                                 
14The result is based on pooled data of the four major banks. A negative figure means some banks already have 
sufficient capital to achieve this probability of survival. See Technical Note “Addressing Systemic Risk through 
Higher Loss Absorbency” for more details. 
15It should be noted that there is no internationally agreed “benchmark” and the BCBS’s D-SIB policy 
framework gives national authorities discretion in determining the actual amount of additional capital to be 
required of domestic systemic institutions http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs233.htm. 
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Box 3. Reducing Systemic Risk through Higher Loss Absorbency 
 
Preventing insolvency of systemically important banks or at least securing the continuation of 
their systemically important functions is essential to safeguard financial stability. While 
heightened supervision and credible resolution and recovery planning can mitigate systemic 
risk, higher loss absorbency reduces the probability of insolvency of a bank.  
 
How much supplementary capital should be required from systemically important institutions 
depends on the desired probability of survival of the institutions. This probability could be set 
in absolute terms or with reference to non-systemic institutions. For example, if the impact of 
failure of a systemic institution is deemed to be ten times as large as that of a non-systemic 
institution, capital requirements for the systemic institutions could be set in such a way that its 
probability of insolvency is ten times less than that of a non-systemic institution.  
 
Moody’s KMV’s Expected Default Frequency (EDF) can be used to quantify the relationship 
between capitalization and the likely survival of a bank. The EDF is the probability that a 
company will default within a given time horizon, where default means the failure to make a 
scheduled payment. The EDF depends on equity return volatility, equity values, and the 
distress barrier from the book value of liabilities (e.g., the point at which the value of assets of 
a company falls below the present value of promised payments on debt). The exact 
methodology for the computation of the EDF is confidential, but it is based on a large real 
world database of default probabilities and has a proven track record in predicting default. 
 
EDFs were calculated for the Australian banks for which the information was available and 
plotted against their market capitalization/asset ratio. For the four largest banks this yields the 
relationship shown in the figure below. Given the non-linearity of this relationship, a power 
function was fitted to the data for the purpose of computing the level of market capitalization 
corresponding to a given expected default frequency. For example, if one would like to ensure 
a (very high) probability of survival of 99.95 percent (EDF=0.05), total Tier 1 capital would 
need to be 12.3 percent of risk-weighted assets (compared to an actual average of 10 percent 
during the first half of 2012). The EDF is computed from the default rate for a given distance-
to-default, which in turn is a function of the asset value and asset volatility and the book value 
of liabilities. 
                Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
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III.   ENHANCING FINANCIAL SECTOR OVERSIGHT 
A.   Prudential and Conduct Supervision  
36.      Australia has a “functional” model of financial regulation and supervision with 
separate agencies in charge of prudential regulation and conduct of business. Prudential 
oversight of ADIs, insurers and all large superannuation funds rests with APRA while ASIC 
is responsible for market conduct and consumer protection.16 The RBA has the responsibility 
for overseeing financial system stability and the payments system. The Treasury is also 
involved in financial regulation by providing policy advice to the government. The Minister 
has the legal power to give policy direction to APRA and ASIC, although this power has not 
been used in the case of APRA and only used once in the case of ASIC. Other regulators 
include the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission responsible for promoting 
competition and fair trade in the market place, and the Australian Transaction Reports and 
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), a financial intelligence unit (FIU) responsible for anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).  
37.      APRA maintains a conservative supervisory approach. It is super-equivalent to 
the Basel standard on capital. In particular, APRA imposes more stringent requirements on 
the quality of capital where at least 75 percent of Tier 1 capital is to be accounted for by 
common equity compared with at least 50 percent under Basel II. For smaller banks that use 
a standardized approach, higher risk weights than typical for Basel II are required for 
important asset classes, including equities, certain residential mortgages and retail loans; 
advanced (internal-ratings based) banks must maintain higher minimum LGDs for some 
portfolios than Basel II rules require. APRA intends to keep its conservative stance when 
adopting Basel III. 
B.   The Standards Assessment  
38.      The banking, insurance and securities sectors are assessed under revised 
principles that are more rigorous and comprehensive. These revised principles are Core 
Principles for Banking Supervision, 2006; Insurance Core Principles, 2011; and IOSCO 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 2011. These principles have a heightened 
focus on risk management and are evaluated in the context of a financial system’s 
sophistication, complexity, interconnectedness, size, risk profile and cross-border operation. 
In addition, the rigor of the assessments has significantly increased since the GFC with more 
                                                 
16However, ASIC is also responsible for the overall supervision of a significant number of market 
intermediaries which includes monitoring their compliance with obligations of a prudential nature, including 
those relating to capital requirements and risk management. With regards to the most important market 
intermediaries (ASX Clearing Participants), ASIC shares its regulatory responsibility with ASX that sets and 
monitors their capital requirements.  
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emphasis placed on the quality of supervisory practices. For Australia, the assessments show 
a high degree of compliance in all three sectors.  
39.      APRA takes a proactive, risk-based approach to bank supervision. The approach 
is principles based and outcome oriented, relying more on directors and management to 
interpret and apply regulatory principles than on prescriptive regulations. APRA does not 
prescribe simple regulatory limits, such as LTV ratios or debt-to-income (DTI) ratios; 
preferring internal regulatory guidance such as on collateralization and serviceability that 
takes all loan contract terms into account. APRA’s notable strengths are demonstrated by its 
strong risk analysis embedded in the PAIRS and SOARS system,17 its focus on bank boards’ 
responsibility for risk management, and its assessment of banks on a system wide basis. 
APRA’s on- and off-site supervision is well planned and executed; credit risk management is 
well developed; and its provisioning requirements typically result in higher reserves than 
required under IFRS. Moreover, APRA conveys its expectations for the management of 
specific risks to banks through engagement with bank boards, regular contacts by supervisors 
and risk specialists, and letters and speeches delivered to the industry. This approach has 
been broadly effective. 
40.      APRA has made significant progress in updating the insurance regulatory 
regime since the 2006 FSAP. Achievements include implementing Stage II reforms and 
supervision of general insurance groups;18 broadening enforcement powers; imposing 
restrictions on unauthorized foreign insurers; and providing greater legal clarity in the 
Treasurer’s role in specific supervisory matters. The risk-based supervision framework is 
comprehensive with established internal policies and processes to promote prompt and 
consistent supervisory actions. More importantly, APRA has adequate resources and 
technical capacity to conduct effective supervision.  
41.      ASIC has rightfully earned its reputation as an effective and credible enforcer of 
market regulation, but would benefit from increased resources and budgetary 
flexibility. ASIC’s oversight of the exchanges is effective. A series of high profile and 
successful prosecutions, along with good shareholder protection and high accounting and 
auditing standards, have contributed to its standing in the market. ASIC has also recently 
expanded its surveillance of hedge funds and market intermediaries. However, ASIC is 
hampered in its ability to fully carry out proactive supervision because of the lack of 
budgetary resources. A significant amount of ASIC’s funding is non-core funding earmarked 
for specific projects, and the share of non-core funding has been increasing in the last few 
                                                 
17Probability and Impact Rating System (PAIRS) and Supervisory Oversight And Response System (SOARS). 
18Stage II reforms involved a program of revised prudential requirements covering a wide spectrum of issues 
including risk and reinsurance management, audit and actuarial reporting and valuation, governance, fit and 
proper, capital and assets standards. 
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years. To supervise a large number of financial services licensees, ASIC uses desk-top, rather 
than on-site, reviews for initial risk-based assessments, reflecting in part its resource 
constraints. In determining the target and intensity of its supervisory actions, ASIC relies 
heavily on its initial risk-based assessments, self-reporting of breaches of regulatory 
requirements and third party notifications. It is important that ASIC be given more resources 
and flexibility over its operational budget. 
42.      The assessments have identified a number of areas that would benefit from 
greater emphasis or improvements. Notable gaps include the amount of time devoted to 
on-site supervision for certain risk areas or entities; and the extent to which supervisors 
perform due diligence on senior executive management, directors, controllers, or significant 
shareholders at the time of licensing of certain entities. Specifically: 
 In order for APRA to have comfort that an institution has in place the policies, 
practices and governance necessary to ensure effective liquidity risk management, the 
amount of time allocated to formal on-site review needs to increase from the current 
3-4 days.  
 ASIC should conduct more proactive surveillance of insurers and insurance 
intermediaries, and devote more attention to the proactive supervision of collective 
investment schemes and those market intermediaries that are not exchange members. 
 ASIC should bridge regulatory gaps, and prevent potential risks, by extending risk-
based capital requirements, periodic capital adequacy reporting and large exposure 
rules to some of the AFSLs not regulated by APRA. 
 ASIC should be empowered to make or enforce regulation to ensure the fair treatment 
of insurance customers and the protection of policyholders (e.g., on group-wide 
market conduct, insurer’s claims handling and the servicing of life policies). The 
current regulatory regime dilutes the effectiveness of the conduct of business 
supervision. 
 ASIC and APRA should coordinate more closely to address shortcomings in public 
disclosure requirements for insurers, including the exemption of small and unlisted 
insurers from many disclosure requirements; the limited disclosure on capital 
adequacy for life insurers; the lack of disclosure of sources of earnings analyses; and 
the lack of comprehensive disclosures of corporate governance risks and risk 
management.  
43.      The legal framework contains features that could potentially undermine the 
relevant agencies’ regulatory independence. The Minister has the legal power to give 
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policy direction to both APRA and ASIC and decide on the change in significant ownership 
of an ADI.19 Although such power has rarely been used and may not be used in relation to a 
given regulated entity, its existence could potentially diminish the ability of APRA and ASIC 
to carry out their supervisory and regulatory functions effectively. Therefore, it is important 
for APRA to have the legal power to veto, on prudential grounds, any decision on changes in 
significant ownership. However, the authorities do not view the Minister’s power as 
undermining the independence of the regulatory agencies. Instead, they view it as providing a 
mechanism for transparent interaction with the government on policy grounds, and as an 
important check and balance on the powers of the regulatory agencies, for holding them 
accountable to Parliament, and ultimately, to the people of Australia. 
44.      An AML/CFT assessment of Australia was last conducted by the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering in March 2005. A full AML/CFT 
reassessment is required every five years according to the IMF Board decisions regarding the 
incorporation of AML/CFT into the FSAP. Country authorities have approximately 
18 months from the date of the last FSAP to undergo the FATF assessment. The new FATF 
assessment methodology will not be published until February 2013, with the evaluations 
commencing in late 2013. Australia is scheduled to be one of the first jurisdictions reviewed 
under the revised standards in early 2014 which will fit within the policy of the FSAP. A 
ROSC will be forwarded to the Fund and subsequently circulated to the Board upon adoption 
of the mutual evaluation report by the FATF Plenary. 
C.   Systemic Oversight 
45.      Maintaining financial stability is a shared responsibility. The RBA has long been 
responsible for financial stability, although the mandate is not provided in law. The 
government reaffirmed this responsibility for the RBA in 1998 when the financial regulatory 
structure was changed significantly, and APRA was established. Promoting financial stability 
is also one of APRA’s mandates, which is carried out through prudential regulation and 
supervision. APRA’s PAIRS and SOARS system has an element of systemic oversight in 
that supervisors take a financial institutions’ systemic importance into consideration. The 
system is complemented by APRA’s industry risk registers, which identify emerging risks 
and necessary supervisory actions in each industry.20 ASIC and the Treasury also have roles 
in promoting financial stability, the former through its oversight of capital markets, and the 
latter through its advisory role to the government on financial stability issues and on the 
legislative and regulatory framework underpinning financial system infrastructure.  
                                                 
19Such policy direction is subject to certain controls and there are restrictions on the Minister’s right to approve 
a change in significant ownership of an ADI. 
20These registers relate to four financial sectors: banking, life insurance, general insurance and superannuation. 
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46.      Coordination among the agencies is effective in a largely informal arrangement. 
The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR), comprising the RBA, APRA, ASIC, and the 
Treasury, is the primary coordinating body for the main regulatory agencies. It is chaired by 
the RBA Governor. The CFR is an advisory body with no powers separate from its member 
agencies, but it works to coordinate the activities of the agencies in exercising their own 
powers; cooperation is governed by a series of bilateral MOUs between the agencies. The 
authorities do not believe that formalizing the current arrangement under a single 
“macroprudential authority” is necessary. Their current arrangement, built on a “culture of 
cooperation, dialogue and mutual respect” has served Australia well.21 Indeed, the CFR 
played a key role in shaping the government’s response to the GFC. The recommendation to 
offer a deposit guarantee and establish the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS), for example, was 
made at the CFR. Working groups led by different agencies analyze key issues facing the 
financial system and formulate policy stance for discussion at the CFR. While the CFR has 
been effective, there is scope to make its role more prominent by highlighting its work and 
enhancing the transparency of its deliberative process. A more explicit report of the CFR’s 
deliberations in the Financial Stability Review would be a first step toward this goal. 
47.      There is a well-established mechanism for systemic risk identification and 
monitoring. The RBA has a central role in monitoring financial system soundness and 
warning of potential risks, which are carried out through the publication of its half-yearly 
Financial Stability Review. The Review assesses the health of financial institutions, 
corporations and households and the performance of financial markets, serving as a useful 
tool of communication with financial institutions and the general public. The Review’s 
production requires interagency coordination, and its regular discussion at the CFR before 
publication keeps its members up to date on global financial market developments and their 
implications for domestic financial stability. The Review has been a useful financial stability 
tool, but it could be further improved by incorporating regular stress testing results on the 
financial system once the RBA establishes its own stress testing framework. 
48.      While there is a macroprudential overlay in the authorities’ approach to 
systemic risk monitoring, they do not generally prescribe simple regulatory limits to 
dampen the credit cycle. Tools such as caps on LTV, DTIs, and leverage have been used in 
many developing countries as macroprudential instruments to counter the credit cycle and 
been proven effective, particularly in countries where a managed exchange rate regime 
                                                 
21See speeches by Malcolm Edey, “Macroprudential supervision and the role of central banks” September 2012 
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-ag-280912.html; and Luci Ellis, “Macroprudential Policy: A Suite of 
Tools or a State of Mind?” October 2012 http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-so-111012.html.  
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prevents full deployment of monetary policy in response to domestic conditions.22 A few 
advanced countries have also recently adopted these tools. In the authorities view, the 
efficacy of the use of rules or a model-based-application of such instruments has yet to be 
fully tested in countries with a similar level of financial development and structure to 
Australia. They prefer to focus on judgments about the ability of borrowers to repay and the 
quality of bank lending standards, and adjusting, for example, risk weights or pillar II capital 
as necessary, to respond to rising systemic risk. For Australia, this approach appears to have 
been broadly effective.  
IV.   CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION23 
49.      Commendable steps have been taken to strengthen the legal framework for bank 
resolution and crisis management over the last several years. Significant legislative 
changes since 2008 have established the FCS, enabled APRA to appoint a statutory manager 
to an ADI before the point of insolvency had been reached, and strengthened APRA’s 
powers to facilitate the resolution of ADIs and insurers. A number of these areas were 
identified by the 2006 FSAP as weaknesses in the framework for bank resolution and crisis 
management. 
50.      Responsibilities for bank resolution and crisis management are shared among 
the CFR agencies. The RBA serves as the lender of last resort, APRA is the resolution 
authority for prudentially supervised institutions and administers the FCS, and the Treasurer 
is responsible for making declarations that the FCS applies to a particular ADI. In addition to 
bilateral MOUs, an MOU on Financial Distress Management among the CFR agencies 
signed in 2008 facilitates coordinated responses to stress in the financial system. Given the 
history of few bank failures, the FCS has never been activated for an ADI and the resolution 
powers in their current form have not been tested.24 A key priority, therefore, would be to 
continue enhancing crisis preparedness through early planning with particular attention to 
formulating an effective communication strategy. 
51.      Crisis preparedness can be enhanced by conducting regular simulations. The 
CFR agencies have been actively engaged in developing crisis resolution strategies and 
policy guidance, undertaking crisis simulation exercises in 2009 and 2011. Further efforts 
                                                 
22See “Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences” 
IMF Working Paper 11/238. 
23See Technical Note “Crisis Management” for further discussion of the issues. The authorities have also issued 
a public consultation paper on “Strengthening APRA’s Crisis Management Powers” in September 2012 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/2012/APRA/Key%20Docs/P
DF/Discussion%20Paper.ashx. 
24The FCS has been activated for a very small insurer. 
  30   
 
should be directed at both broad and focused crisis simulations with regular frequency. 
Simulations testing the overall framework should occur about every two years while targeted 
testing should be done more frequently, with a simulation of a systemic liquidity shock 
conducted in the near term. Furthermore, APRA should ensure that ADIs adopt single 
customer view (SCV) recordkeeping as quickly as possible, which is imperative for 
determining the amount of guaranteed deposits.  
52.      The authorities should adopt measures to mitigate moral hazard inherent in a 
highly concentrated banking sector. The FCS is ex post funded, backed by a standing 
budgetary authorization of up to A$20 billion per ADI, and enjoys a priority in claims on 
liquidation recoveries. An optional levy on the industry provides a mechanism to make up 
any shortfall in recouping guaranteed depositor payment.25 However, ex post funding and the 
levy’s optional feature are not consistent with international best practices requiring banks to 
bear the cost of their own failures.26 An ex ante funded deposit insurance scheme is one of 
several methods that are available to mitigate the moral hazard by imposing costs on the 
industry.27 An ex ante deposit insurance scheme should have a credible and adequate reserve 
fund built up from periodic flat-rate assessments on ADIs’ deposits initially but changing to 
risk-based assessments over time, and the fund’s investment objective should emphasize 
liquidity and safety over return.28 An ex ante funded deposit guarantee scheme, together with 
higher loss absorbency requirements (as discussed above ), appear to represent the best option 
for Australia since the infrastructure is already in place.29  
53.      Continued efforts are warranted for recovery and resolution planning. 
Consistent with other jurisdictions, APRA initiated a pilot program in 2011 requiring the six 
largest ADIs to develop recovery plans. The planning exercise focused primarily on 
                                                 
25Most ex post funded deposit guarantee schemes are pro-cyclical in that levies are imposed on the industry 
during a downturn. This is not necessarily the case with the FCS since the levy is optional and can be imposed, 
if and when the government deems appropriate. 
26Principle 11–Funding of the Deposit Insurance Core Principles (DICPs) and Principle 6 of the Key Attributes 
for Effective Resolution http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf.  
27Other options include a financial institutions tax, higher loss absorbency through bail-in, and resolution or 
stability funds financed by the industry. These options are discussed further in the IMF’s June 2010 report, “A 
Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector” 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf and the IMF’s 2012 Staff Discussion Note 12/-3, “From 
Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions” 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1203.pdf. 
28As a simple rule of thumb, a deposit insurance fund should cover deposits of two to three mid-sized banks.  
29To be fair, the authorities had carefully considered ex-ante funding in the design phase of the FCS but decided 
not to pursue it because of Australia’s unique circumstances, including the lack of government securities and 
limited highly rated domestic corporate bonds for such a fund to invest in. 
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mitigating measures they could adopt to overcome impairments to their capital and liquidity 
positions in a severe scenario and re-establish their financial viability without official support 
within a realistic timeframe. APRA plans to extend recovery planning requirements to mid-
sized ADIs (assets greater than A$5 billion) in 2013. Eventually, such requirements should 
be extended to all ADIs and appropriately tailored to their size. APRA should also conduct 
annual checks to ensure that the recovery and contingency plans are up-to-date and adequate. 
In addition, APRA should introduce resolution planning requirements for at least the major 
banks, which will increase the efficiency of the resolution process and reduce potential losses 
should the need arise to resolve a systemic bank. APRA has had extensive discussions with 
the industry but no decision has been made so far. 
54.      Concrete steps have been taken to facilitate cross-border cooperation between 
the Australian and New Zealand authorities on financial stability matters. In 2005-2006, 
both the Australian and New Zealand parliaments enacted laws that imposed reciprocal 
obligations on APRA and the New Zealand prudential supervisor, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand (RBNZ), to support each other in meeting statutory responsibilities for prudential 
regulation and financial stability. As a result, APRA has an explicit statutory obligation: (i) to 
support the New Zealand authorities in meeting their statutory responsibilities for financial 
stability in New Zealand; (ii) to the extent reasonably practicable, avoid any action that is 
likely to have a detrimental effect on financial system stability in New Zealand; and (iii) to 
consult with and consider the advice of the New Zealand authorities, when practicable, 
before taking action that is likely to have a detrimental effect on financial system stability in 
New Zealand.30  
55.      The spillover effect from Australia to New Zealand is likely to be limited.31 While 
subsidiaries of major Australian banks account for 90 percent of banking assets in New 
Zealand, these subsidiaries are ring-fenced. In principle, a subsidiary—as opposed to a 
branch—is better able to continue as a going concern should the parent fail or have to be 
resolved because they are locally incorporated and the host authorities would require the 
subsidiary to maintain sufficient capital and liquidity buffers in the country. The statutory 
obligations of both supervisors also help to limit the spillover effects. In addition, the Trans-
Tasman Council on Banking Supervision (TTBC), which was formed in 2005 and comprises 
key representatives of Australian and New Zealand regulatory agencies, provides a 
mechanism for cooperation and coordination during financial stress. The TTBC has been 
developing crisis resolution strategies for trans-Tasman banks which include policy and 
operational guidance, and conducted crisis simulation exercises in 2011.  
                                                 
30The primary obligations are set out in Section 8A of the APRA Act. 
31This analysis is based on staff desk assessment as opposed to an investigation conducted in the field. Staff 
drew from the analysis in “Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?” March 2011 by Fiechter et al 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1104.pdf. 
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56.      The authorities are encouraged to take steps to enhance cross-border 
coordination arrangements with other jurisdictions. Other cross-border operations of 
Australian ADIs account for approximately 5 percent of banking sector assets. Australian 
operations of foreign banks (mainly in the form of branches) account for around 12 percent 
of domestic banking sector assets. At this point, APRA has in place bilateral MOUs on 
supervisory matters with a number of foreign supervisory agencies, including those in the 
U.S. and the U.K.  Discussions for the development of other MOUs focused on bank 
resolution and crisis management with the U.S. and other relevant jurisdictions are ongoing.
  33   
 
Appendix 1. Australia: Risk Assessment Matrix 
Nature/Source of 
Main Threats 
Relative Probability of Realization of 
Threat (in the next two years) 
Expected Impact on Financial Stability if Threat is 
Realized 
Volatility in 
wholesale and 
external funding 
Staff assessment: MEDIUM 
Banks' funding profile has improved since 
the global financial crisis, but they continue 
to rely on wholesale and external funding. 
With an uncertain global outlook and an 
unsettled situation in Europe, these funding 
sources are likely to remain volatile.  
Staff assessment: MEDIUM 
Banks’ foreign currency liability positions are largely hedged 
and the explicit liquidity support from the RBA means that a 
reversal of capital flows would unlikely result in forced asset 
sales. Nevertheless, volatility in international funding 
markets could raise banks’ funding costs and put pressure 
on profit margins. 
Terms of trade 
shock  
Staff assessment: LOW/MEDIUM 
Australia’s terms of trade have benefited 
from exceptionally strong commodities 
demand from Asia, especially China. As 
China’s growth slows, commodities prices 
are likely to become more volatile with 
increased probability of a major correction. 
Staff assessment: HIGH 
A large decline in the terms of trade would reduce GDP 
growth, boost unemployment and widen the current account 
deficit.  
Slower growth and higher unemployment would undermine 
credit quality by constraining the ability of the household 
sector to service its debt, already among the highest 
(relative to disposable income) in advanced economies.  
Slower growth and a larger current account deficit may lead 
to a reversal of capital inflows, causing a funding shock. 
Collapse in 
housing or 
commercial real 
estate prices 
Staff assessment: LOW/MEDIUM  
House prices have declined gradually over 
the past year, but a collapse in house 
prices appears unlikely. No construction 
boom has accompanied the run-up in 
house prices, and supply remains quite 
tight. Commercial real estate prices have 
seen a large correction since 2008 but still 
appear high by international comparison 
Staff assessment: MEDIUM/HIGH  
The household sector is not highly leveraged, and an 
average LTV ratio of 50 percent on mortgages provides a 
buffer against a large decline in house prices. Nevertheless, 
about a quarter of mortgages have an LTV of 80 percent or 
more at origination, borrowed mostly by first time home 
buyers and low income households. The buffer for this 
group is much smaller and a large decline in house prices 
would have an impact on asset quality. Commercial real 
estate represents about 10 percent of banks’ exposures and 
a sharp fall in prices would impair banks’ balance sheets. 
Contagion risk 
arising from bank 
concentration  
Staff assessment: MEDIUM  
Dominated by four major banks, the 
Australian banking system is one of the 
most concentrated in the world. The four 
banks have similar business models, and 
such similarities may be a source of 
contagion risk. 
Staff assessment: HIGH  
The similarities in their lending and funding mean that stress 
in one bank could be quickly transmitted to others. The ex 
post funded deposit guarantee program (the Financial 
Claims Scheme) seems inadequate to address such a 
contagion risk, meaning that other resolution options would 
be needed, possibly involving the use of fiscal resources. 
Exposure New 
Zealand 
Staff assessment: LOW  
About 40 percent of Australian banks’ 
cross-border-exposure is to New Zealand 
and a downturn there would hamper the 
asset quality of Australian banks. 
Staff assessment: LOW  
The two countries are both net importers of capital and, due 
to their interconnected funding relationship, an external 
funding shock could get amplified. 
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Appendix 2. Economic and Financial Indicators 
 
Financial System Structure 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics and Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Total assets (In billions of AUD) Total assets (In percent of GDP)
Dec. 2008 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2010 Dec. 2011 Dec. 2008 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2010 Dec. 2011
Authorized deposit taking institutions (ADIs) 2794.0 2704.9 2799.6 2954.0 226.6 215.8 206.7 204.9
Banks 2672.6 2582.0 2668.8 2818.2 216.7 206.0 197.1 195.5
   Number of institutions 55 53 54 61 … … … …
Building societies 21.0 22.7 25.2 21.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.5
Credit unions 45.4 47.2 51.6 53.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.7
Registered financial corportations (RFCs) 244.3 173.3 167.9 160.4 19.8 13.8 12.4 11.1
Money market corporations 108.5 67.5 64.8 57.2 8.8 5.4 4.8 4.0
Finance companies and general financiers 135.8 105.8 103.1 103.2 11.0 8.4 7.6 7.2
Managed funds 1036.3 1176.1 1221.3 1210.5 84.0 93.8 90.2 84.0
Superannuation funds 711.1 866.5 929.6 945.8 57.7 69.1 68.6 65.6
Public unit trusts 263.2 257.8 254.3 230.5 21.3 20.6 18.8 16.0
Cash management trusts 44.7 38.3 24.5 22.3 3.6 3.1 1.8 1.5
Common funds 11.8 7.7 7.4 7.2 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5
Friendly soceities 5.5 5.8 5.5 4.7 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
Insurance 314.3 327.9 331.6 336.8 25.5 26.2 24.5 23.4
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 383.4 246.9 214.6 221.6 31.1 19.7 15.8 15.4
Total financial system assets 4772.3 4629.1 4734.9 4883.3 387.0 369.3 349.6 338.7
Memorandium items:  
Total external debt 1159.3 1160.6 1150.7 1269.2 94.0 92.6 85.0 88.0
   Long-term 664.8 693.1 700.7 777.5 53.9 55.3 51.7 53.9
   Short-term 338.2 322.7 309.0 334.7 27.4 25.7 22.8 23.2
   Direct investment liabilities 156.3 144.8 141.0 157.0 12.7 11.5 10.4 10.9
ADI external debt 625.7 670.5 624.2 633.5 50.7 53.5 46.1 43.9
   Long-term 348.8 366.5 343.8 331.5 28.3 29.2 25.4 23.0
   Short-term 276.9 304.0 280.4 301.9 22.5 24.3 20.7 20.9
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Financial Soundness Indicators 
 
  Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) database.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Q1
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 11.3 11.9 11.4 11.6 11.6
Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 8.5 9.3 9.6 10.2 10.3
Non-performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital 11.2 17.2 20.4 19.3 18.3
Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 1.3 2.0 2.2 2.0 1.9
Sectoral Distribution of Total Loans
   Residents 96.1 97.3 96.8 96.9 96.9
   Deposit-takers 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
   Other Financial Corporations 4.6 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.9
   General Government 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8
   Nonfinancial Corporations 30.2 27.8 26.1 25.8 25.7
   Other Domestic Sectors 59.8 64.9 66.7 67.1 67.2
   Nonresidents 3.9 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.1
Return on Assets 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 ...
Return on Equity 18.9 18.6 20.0 22.3 ...
Interest Margin to Gross Income 65.3 52.6 54.8 71.2 ...
Non-interest Expenses to Gross Income 47.4 56.8 57.2 45.5 ...
Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset Ratio) 14.2 14.5 15.6 16.1 16.3
Liquid Assets to Short Term Liabilities 34.6 35.2 38.5 39.2 40.8
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Selected Economic Indicators 
 
  Sources: Bloomberg; IMF International Finance Statistics; and IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
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Selected Financial Sector Indicators 
 
 Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics; Australian Office of Finance Management; Bloomberg; IMF Financial Statistics; and 
 IMF Financial Soundness Indications database. 
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Appendix 3. Australia FSAP Update Stress Test Matrix 
 
  Solvency Stress Test Liquidity Stress Test 
Who 
performed the 
stress test 
Two complementary approaches:  
FSAP team in conjunction with APRA (top 
down/bottom up). 
FSAP team in conjunction with APRA.  
Institutions 
covered 
Five of the largest Australian banks (ANZ, 
CBA, NAB, Westpac and Macquarie). 
Five of the largest Australian banks (ANZ, CBA, 
NAB, Westpac and Macquarie). 
Severity of 
shocks 
The bottom up stress tests was based on a 
scenario of disorderly resolution of the 
European debt problem that triggers a 
sharp downturn in advanced economies. 
As a result, the severe stress scenario 
includes a GDP growth decline to minus 
5 percent (which is more than a 4 standard 
deviations shock), a 50 percent drop in 
commodity prices, a 35 percent decline in 
house prices and an increase in the 
unemployment rate from 5.25 percent to 
12 percent. In addition to the severe shock 
scenario, the top down test considered 
slow growth and mild recession (one- and 
two- standard deviation shocks to GDP 
growth) scenarios. 
Severe bank run type scenario, with a gradual 
outflow of funding and accounting for market 
illiquidity of assets in case of fire sales. 
Data Used Individual banks’ and supervisory data 
 
Individual banks’ and supervisory data. 
Risk horizon Three years for bottom-up, five years for 
top-down 
A gradual outflow of funding for a time frame of 
(a) 5 weeks and (b) fixed period (30 days). 
Metrics Expected losses (EL), Banks capitalization 
(CAR, Tier 1 Ratio). 
Asset and Liability maturity profile. 
Asset and Liability gap. 
Positions and 
Risk Factors 
On-balance and off-balance sheet  
Credit risk and market risk 
On-balance sheet. 
Methodology Banks models and APRA generated 
portfolio specific migration matrices, PDs 
and LGDs 
FSAP team: balance-sheet ST approach. 
FSAP team and authorities: combination of 
models, including Implied Cash Flow balance-
sheet ST approach. 
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Appendix 4. Stress Test Methodologies and Assumptions1 
 
1.      Stress testing was conducted jointly by the IMF and APRA as part of the 2012 
FSAP Update for Australia.2 The exercise consisted of stress tests performed by individual 
banks under the guidance of APRA, (a bottom-up approach), and systemic macro-financial 
analyses undertaken by the IMF in close cooperation with APRA (a top-down approach). The 
tests assessed credit, market, funding and liquidity risks for five of the largest banks (ANZ, 
CBA, NAB, Westpac, and Macquarie), which together account for 80 percent of banking 
assets in Australia. The centerpiece of this exercise was the credit-risk-focused solvency 
tests, which covered a period of five years under the top-down approach, using financial and 
supervisory data as of March 2012. The stress tests were conducted on consolidated basis, 
and thus considered Australian banks’ cross-border-exposure, and in particular its credit 
exposure to New Zealand. The top-down results were consistent with the outcomes of the 
bottom-up tests, which used data as of September 2011 and covered a period of three years. 
Solvency stress tests 
2.      The top-down stress tests simulated the impact of three different macroeconomic 
scenarios. These included a slow growth scenario, a mild recession scenario and a severe 
recession scenario, which were designed to capture a wide range of possible outcomes. Using 
the IMF World Economic Outlook forecast of April 2012 as a baseline, shocks to real GDP 
growth produced by the slow growth, mild recession and severe recession scenarios were 
equivalent to one, two and four standard deviations, respectively. The standard deviations 
were based on the volatility of annual GDP growth since 1960. For the slow growth and mild 
recession scenarios, the shocks were applied over the first three years with positive 
adjustment dynamics during the subsequent two years. For the severe recession scenario, the 
path of adjustment was specified for key macroeconomic variables (see table below). 
Severe Scenario Projections for Key Economic Variables 
Variable  Year 0 Scenario 
GDP year-ended growth 2½ percent Trough is -5 percent (in Year 1) 
Unemployment rate 5¼ percent Peak is 12 percent (in Year 3) 
Inflation year-ended change 3½ percent Trough is ½ percent (in Year 4) 
Cash rate 4¾ percent Low is 1 percent (from Year 1) 
Total credit year-ended growth   3 percent Trough is -3½ percent (in Year 2) 
Equity prices  Up to 47 percent decline (in Year 1) 
House prices  35 percent decline (up to Year 3) 
Commercial property prices  40 percent decline (up to Year 3) 
         Source: APRA, IMF and RBA. 
                                                 
1The author of this appendix is Iryna Kaminska (ICD). 
2There were no issues with data quality and data sharing in conducting this exercise.  
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3.      The severe recession scenario was designed by the authorities to evaluate the risk 
bearing capacity of the Australian banking system. Compared to the standard practice of 
applying shocks of 1-3 standard deviations in recent stress testing exercises in other 
jurisdictions, the shock of 4 standard deviations is severe but plausible (see table below). The 
scenario is comparable to the experience of the United States and the United Kingdom during 
the global financial crisis when GDP growth in the United States swung from 1 percent to 
-5 percent, and from 4 percent to -5 percent in the United Kingdom. The severe recession 
scenario assumes a disorderly resolution of the fiscal problems in Europe, triggering 
dislocation in global debt and funding markets, and a sharp slowdown in China. The implied 
reduction in Chinese demand for minerals lowers commodity prices by over 50 percent from 
the peak, with a consequent depreciation of the exchange rate. Domestically, households and 
businesses respond to the external shock by reducing investment and consumption 
expenditure. As a result, output falls and unemployment rises substantially, which feeds back 
into rising defaults and sharp declines in house prices and commercial property prices. The 
subsequent recovery in the domestic economy is very weak, with unemployment remaining 
at high levels for several years.  
The Severity of Shocks (scenarios in selected FSAP stress tests1) 
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Shocks in standard 
deviations 
 
GDP % 
(yoy) GDP % (yoy), and deviation from baseline 
Australia, 2012 2.05 -4.96 -7.99 0 -3.5 1.36 -2.14 ≈ 4 s.d. over last 50 years 
USA, 2010 -0.5 2.3 -0.8 0.8 -1.7 2.6 0.2 ≈ 1 s.d. over last 50 years 
Germany, 2011 3.3 0.5 -1.5 -1 -3 2.7 0.9 ≈ 2.6 s.d. over last 30 years 
Spain, 2012 0.7 -4.1 -2.4 -1.7 -1.4 0.1 -1.1 ≈ 1 s.d. over last 30 years 
  Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
  1The 1-3 standard deviation scenarios assumed in recent FSAPs are in line with industry standards.  
  For example, the 2011 EBA stress tests were based on 1.3–1.4 standard deviations, and the 2011  
  UK FSA stress tests were based on 2 standard deviations. 
4.      The top-down stress tests were based on the balance-sheet approach of 
Schmieder et al.3 The approach provides a quantitative framework for assessing how 
macroeconomic shocks transmit to banks’ balance sheets. Under this approach, the impact of 
the macroeconomic scenarios on each bank’s profitability and capitalization is estimated 
through credit losses and changes in risk-weighted assets (RWAs). In particular, sector-
specific credit losses were projected, based on stressed probabilities of default (PDs) and 
losses given default (LGDs) estimated by (relatively simple) satellite models, which link 
                                                 
3Schmieder, Puhr, and Hasan, 2011, “Next Generation Balance Sheet Stress Testing,” IMF Working Paper 
11/83. 
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non-performing loans (NPLs) and LGDs to a set of empirically relevant macro indicators, 
e.g., GDP growth, interest rates, and equity prices (see figure below). 
Projected NPLs 
 
             Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
5.      The stress tests made a number of simple assumptions. Banks’ RWAs under stress 
for credit risk were simulated to reflect corresponding changes in PDs, as required under 
Basel II, while RWAs for other risks were left unchanged. Dividend payout was assumed to 
be zero in cases of negative income and/or capital falling below the regulatory minimum. 
Banks’ portfolio allocation and income components were kept constant during the projection 
period. Basel II hurdle rates were applied in this exercise, 4 percent for Tier 1 and 8 percent 
for total capital, consistent with APRA’s minimum requirements.  
6.      Inputs used for this exercise included data from standard supervisory returns 
and additional data provided by banks. Banks provided starting impairment level 
positions and their own sector-specific risk estimates, such as LGDs and PDs. The data 
covered six major exposure types, including residential mortgages, credit cards, commercial 
properties, corporates, banks, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Some inputs, such 
as PDs and LGDs, differ considerably across banks because of different levels of risk 
appetite and business strategies. Applying the satellite models would result in the sector and 
bank specific PDs and LGDs (see figure below). 
Projected Sectoral PDs and LGDs 
 
   Source: IMF Staff calculations. 
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7.      The results show that the Australian banking system appears to be resilient 
against substantial shocks. Aggregate Tier 1 capital remained above the regulatory 
minimum under all three scenarios (see figure below). The Tier 1 capital ratio has increased 
2.5 percentage points on average since 2008, and this capital buffer significantly enhances 
the resilience of the system. In contrast, total capital, which has not increased by as much, 
would fall slightly below the hurdle rate under the severe scenario. These results are 
consistent with the bottom-up stress test results, both in terms of the evolution of Tier 1 and 
total capital.  
Impact of Alternative Scenarios on Bank Capitalization 
  
  Source: IMF Staff Calculations.  
 
Liquidity stress tests 
8.      The Implied Cash Flow Test (ICFT) was used to assess the ability of banks to 
withstand funding shocks. In assessing banks’ counterbalancing capacity in the event of a 
bank-run type scenario, a gradual outflow of funding was simulated for five consecutive 
periods within a 30 day timeframe, similar to the currently proposed Basel III Liquidity 
Cover Ratio (LCR) calculations.4 The need for asset fire sales was taken into account in the 
scenarios and the haircuts were asset specific. The test indicates which portion of banks’ 
portfolios will remain liquid under a specific scenario, and how much liquidity shortfall will 
occur at the bank and system level. It should be noted that this test is equivalent to requiring 
banks to meet the Basel III LCR standard several years before it comes into effect, and 
without any use of the RBA Committed Liquidity Facility that the Basel III rules expressly 
allow. It is therefore a much stricter test than the Basel III LCR as presently drafted. 
9.      The ICFT was based on liquidity data on March 31, 2012 collected by APRA on 
a 'Basel QIS Level 2 financial' basis. The gradual five-week scenario assumed a Lehman-
type of shock with the following liquidity outflows by the end of the stress testing period:  
 100 percent of unsecured short-term wholesale funding 
 20 percent of secured wholesale funding 
                                                 
4Note that the Basel III LCR requirement does not come into effect until 1 January 2015. 
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 10 percent of retail term deposits 
 20 percent of retail demand deposits 
10.      The test results show that the alternative treatments allowable under the LCR 
rules are crucial in a system with insufficient liquid assets. Without such arrangements, or 
central bank repo operations in a broader range of collateral than the LCR rules assume, the 
five banks would be unable to withstand liquidity outflows of the levels observed in other 
countries after Lehman’s failure, experiencing a substantial shortfall in liquidity within two 
weeks (see figure below). They would be able to counterbalance the liquidity outflows for an 
additional week if RBA operations occurred but were restricted to external assets for repo, 
with an assumed average haircut of 10 percent. If the RBA’s current repo arrangements were 
assumed, including self-securitized residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) accepted 
for repo, all banks would be able to counterbalance the funding outflows even with 
significant haircuts on the assets. 
Outcome of Implied Cash Flow Stress Tests for Australian Banks 
(5-week cumulative cash flow) 
 
 
11.      This outcome reflects specific assumptions on deposits as well as some 
peculiarities of the Australian financial system. Reflecting APRA’s conservative 
approach, most retail deposits were classified as demand deposits for this test, with only a 
negligible portion (0.1 percent) classified as term deposits that cannot be broken without 
penalty.5 Thus, the assumed shocks had a larger impact on Australian banks than on banks in 
other OECD countries with a smaller deposit base. Reflecting the strong fiscal position in 
Australia, government debt levels are low and as a result there is a shortage of high quality 
liquid assets available for banks to hold. The lack of liquid assets thus implies that liquidity 
support from the RBA would be necessary; although the RBA’s current operational liquidity 
                                                 
5APRA's analysis of the Terms & Conditions of these products - allied with consumer protection wording 
currently in force as part of the Corporations Act - indicates that banks do not have the unequivocal right to 
refuse early redemption requests for term deposits. Product offerings could be expected to evolve in the lead-up 
to the introduction of the LCR; if so, the results presented here are a lower bound on the results that would 
apply once the LCR comes into effect.  
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arrangements are sufficient. The results of the ICFT tests were broadly consistent with the 
BCBS QIS tests conducted by APRA on a regular basis.  
12.      The liquidity tests were complemented by an analysis of international contagion 
risks. The analysis is intended to identify the effects of a funding shock, where the distress of 
one banking system leads to a liquidity squeeze and associated fire sale losses for other 
banking systems exposed to funding from the distressed system. The analysis is based on 
bilateral banking exposures across 27 countries and their capital level data at end-September 
2011. Two simulations were explored: (i) interbank exposures only (Simulation 1); and 
(ii) with outstanding derivative contracts or contingent liabilities (guarantees, credit 
commitments) included (Simulation 2). Key assumptions for the funding shock included a 
withdrawal of 35 percent of interbank funding and a haircut of 10-35 percent on forced asset 
sales.  
13.      Funding shocks from a few countries may have a potentially large impact on the 
Australian banking system. Banks in United States, United Kingdom, and Japan have the 
largest claims on Australia, amounting to $298 billion at end-September 2011 (see figure 
below). Derivatives and contingent claims from these countries totaled another $199 billion. 
Germany, Switzerland and France are the next tier of countries to which Australian is 
exposed, but the exposure is much smaller. The impact of G7 countries withdrawing their 
funding all at once would be 4 percent of Tier I capital in Simulation 1 and 6 percent in 
Simulation 2, assuming a haircut of 10 percent on forced asset sales.6 The impact would grow 
to 20 percent of Tier I capital in Simulation 1 and 30 percent in Simulation 2 with a haircut 
of 35 percent on forced asset sales. Overall, the results were sensitive to the assumptions, but 
the relative importance of systemic countries would be the same. 
 Market Risks 
14.      Banks conduct single-factor stress tests on market risks regularly as required by 
APRA. As part of quarterly reporting requirements, banks submit to APRA regular 
sensitivity analyses of their banking and trading books to movements in foreign exchange 
rates, interest rates and commodity prices. For interest rate risk, the tests include both the 
instantaneous impact of interest rate movements on the economic value (i.e., equity) and the 
delayed impact on next year’s net interest income. For foreign exchange risk, banks estimate 
the impact on income (in AUD) of a range of foreign exchange spot rates and implied 
volatilities for all relevant currency pairs.7  
                                                 
6Assuming no funding from other sources, including central banks, would be available. 
7A standard measure of FX risk is net open position for each currency. However, as the FX positions 
undertaken by the banks are in many cases very non-linear, APRA does not consider net open positions as an 
appropriate measure of FX risk.  
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Spillovers to Australian banking system: Funding Shock 
(impairments as percent of Tier 1 capital)  
  
Note: 1/Prepared by S. Arslanalp according to Marco Espinosa-Vega and Juan Solé, 2010, “Cross-border 
Financial Surveillance: A Network Perspective,” IMF Working Paper 10/105 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund). 
2/All bilateral exposure data come from the BIS consolidated banking statistics (Table 9C–E of BIS statistics).  
 
15.      The results of the bottom-up stress tests show limited vulnerability to market 
risk. Based on end-March 2012 data, the adverse impact of market risk reported by 
banks appears to be small (see table below). For foreign exchange risk, a 20 percent 
depreciation/appreciation against all major currencies has a negligible impact on the system 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), reflecting, among other things, the banks’ effective hedging 
 of FX risk involved in offshore funding. The impact of interest rate risk appears slightly 
larger, although it remains small and is offset by higher capital requirements as APRA 
requires banks to hold capital for interest rate risk in the banking book as a Pillar 1 
requirement. Banks’ direct exposure to commodity prices is smaller than their exposure to 
interest rate and foreign exchange rate risk. Typically, different banks have significant 
exposures to different commodities and their positions vary from quarter to quarter, limiting 
the scope for any significant aggregate exposure across the five banks.  
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Sensitivity to Market Risk 
(Largest adverse impacts on P&L as reported by banks) 
Shock 
Impact 
(% of 
CT1) 
Appreciation in different currencies (+20 percent) negligible
Depreciation in different currencies (-20 percent) negligible
Parallel downward shift in the AUD yield curve by 250 basis points negligible
Parallel upward shift in the AUD yield curve by 200 basis points -0.9% 
Steepening of the AUD yield curve, with long-term interest rates increasing by 200 
bps -1.2% 
Inversion of the AUD yield curve (hump), with two-year rates shifting upwards by 
200 bps and 10-year rates rising by 100 bps -1.3% 
Parallel upward shift of the USD (and other key currencies) yield curve by 100 bps negligible
Downward shift of the USD (and other key currencies) yield curve by 100 bps 
(capped by zero) -0.1% 
40 percent rise in the copper price negligible
40 percent rise in Chicago wheat futures, combined with a doubling of implied 
volatility negligible
  Source: APRA. 
